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e existence of animal 
pain poses a problem for the Christian 
doctrine of the joint omnipotence and 
benevolence of God is recognized by many 
Christian apologists. Among these are such 
illustrious names as C. E. M. Joad, C. S. 
Lewis and Peter Geach. Geach touches upon 
the matter in Chapter 4 of his book, 
PROVIDENCE AND EVIL. In that chapter, 
entitled "Animal Pain" Geach informs us 
that 
One virtue, if I am right, that 
God cannot share with his creatures 
is the virtue of sympathy with 
physical suffering. It is virtuous 
that a man should in measure 
sympathize with the suffering of 
the lower animals . . . God is 
not an animal as men are, and if he 
does not change his designs to avoid 
pain and suffering in animals he is 
not violating any natural sympathies 
. • . only anthropomorphic imagination 
allows us to accuse God of cruelty 
in this regard. (pp. 79-80) 
In other words, God's acquiescence in 
the existence of animal pain and suffering, 
great as such pain and suffering must be 
acknowledged to be, is no reflection on 
God's perfect benevolence. It would 
appear that God simply lacks the ability 
to be moved by animal pain and suffering. 
He is simply indifferent to it. Men, on 
the other hand, who do experience pain and 
suffering, possess this ability to 
sympathize, at least with those animals 
most like themselves. 
One might wish to reply that God's   
inability to sympathize with pain and  
suffering marks a real limitation on his   
omnipotence. Geach, however, is ready   
with a reply to such a critic: God is   
not absolutely omnipotent. Geach argues   
that Aquinas also recognizes limitations   
to God's Omnipotenceo i  and borrows an   
example from him, the purport of which   
is that God cannot alter the past. On 
page 24, Geach reproduces a list from  
Aquinas of things that the latter claimed   
God could not do. Included are being a 
body, being tired or oblivious, being   
angry or sorrowful, suffering violence   
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or being overcome, or undergoing corruption. 
About this list writes, "it's no good arguingrgU:1.n  
that God cannot do what God has done, and 
in the incarnation God did do all these things 
Aquinas said God cannot do." (p. 25) Now 
we are left to wonder why it is that God 
can do just the sorts of things a man can 
do and because of which it is virtuous of 
man to sympathize with the animals, and yet 
God cannot sympathize with the animals. 
In view of this contradiction, I think we 
can safely and justly conclude that Geach 
has not given us a reasonable account of 
the correct Christian view toward animal 
pain and suffering. 
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